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Economists sometimes decry the persistence with which firms set prices above marginal cost 
and thus, according to the economists, fail to maximize profits.  But it is the economists who 
have it wrong – first, because variable accounting costs are not always a good proxy for 
marginal economic costs, but more importantly because in an industry with U-shaped cost 
curves, a firm at a long-run sustainable equilibrium faces increasing marginal costs – i.e., a 
rising shadow price on some constrained input – i.e., in general, a cost of capital.  A corollary 
is that in such an industry the equilibrium mark-up over variable cost varies directly with 
capital intensity. 
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   In their classic and often cited paper, Hall and Hitch (1939) – writing on behalf of a 
“group of economists in Oxford … studying problems connected with the trade cycle” – 
reported survey results that “cast[] doubt on the general applicability of the conventional 
analysis of price and output policy in terms of marginal cost and marginal revenue”, 
suggesting rather a common reliance by businesses on “the ‘full cost’ principle” of price 
setting. 
[T]he procedure can be not unfairly generalized as follows:  prime (or “direct”) cost 
per unit is taken as the base, a percentage addition is made to cover overheads …, and 
a further conventional addition … is made for profit.  (p. 19) 
Subsequent survey results over the years have been in general agreement with this finding 
(Govindarajan and Anthony, 1983; Shim and Sudit, 1995; Greenslade and Parker, 2008), and 
a number of marketing textbooks present this “mark up pricing” strategy as at least a default 
model to be followed (Lilien, et al., 1992; Thompson and Strickland, 1999; Czinkota and 
Kotabe, 2001).
1 
  The economics profession has remained mostly unpersuaded.  A recent paper by Al-
Najjar, Baliga, and Besanko (2008, hereinafter ABB) continues the long tradition of 
economists examining the pricing practices of firms and finding them wanting.  ABB note 
that economic theory “offers the unambiguous prescription that only marginal cost is relevant 
for profit-maximizing pricing decisions” and contrast this with the findings of survey 
researchers such as Hall and Hitch and with statements in textbooks of managerial and cost 
accounting that “overwhelmingly, companies around the globe use full costs rather than 
variable costs” to set prices – i.e. they mistakenly “treat fixed and sunk costs as relevant for 
pricing decisions.”
2 
  Firmly in this tradition, ABB model the process by which “naïve” managers in their 
“confusion” allow “irrelevant” factors such as sunk costs to “distort” their pricing, and then 
consider how and under what circumstances the distorted prices may persist despite the 
presence of competition and attempted profit maximization.
3  They conclude that especially 
in oligopolistic industries with differentiated products, such distortions may persist and even 
thrive – in fact they may accidentally lead to higher prices that are closer to those that 
maximize profits in the presence of product differentiation than those that might be chosen 
otherwise. 
                                                 
1 See also the interesting summary discussion in FTC (2002). 
2 The first and third quotations in this paragraph are the words of ABB, while the second is their quotation from 
a “leading textbook on managerial and cost accounting”. 
3 The quoted words are ABB’s.   2
  I suggest that there are two problems with this line of reasoning.  The first is empirical 
and practical.  It is by now well established in the industrial economics literature that the 
average variable cost data published in a firm’s (or industry’s) income statements may be a 
poor proxy for the theoretical concept of marginal cost.  Furthermore, what may not be as 
widely appreciated is that the imperfections of the proxy are systematically related to industry 
cost structure.  Thus the point may be relevant not only for this literature but more broadly, 
including to the occasional industrial economics or antitrust paper that infers market power 
from price-cost margins calculated from firm or industry income statements. 
  The second problem is more fundamental.  It is difficult to understand how a firm that 
sets its prices at true marginal cost is able to survive as a going concern unless that true 
marginal cost includes the marginal cost of capital.  In any kind of long run steady state, a 
firm’s revenues must repay not only its operating costs but also its invested capital.  A 
rational firm may certainly set prices that do not include a return to capital in a non-
equilibrium situation – for example, at a time of excess capacity – but to do so in long run 
equilibrium is a recipe for decline and exit.
4 
  Consider some of the history of the discussion.  In the 1960s and 70s, a fierce debate 
raged between the Chicago-style and Harvard-style practitioners of industrial economics as to 
whether in a particular market a high observed price-cost margin resulted from the superior 
sales performance of firms with the lowest costs, as the former argued, or suggested the 
ability of markets dominated by only a few firms to raise prices, as the latter contended.
5  (It 
was never clear why both could not be true.
6)  One outcome of the debate was an improved 
understanding of the very imperfect correspondence between measures of costs and returns as 
dictated by accounting principles and published in income statements, and as conceptualized 
by economists.  Fisher (1987) and Fisher and McGowan (1983), in particular, noted that 
important items such as advertising, research and development, rents, and indeed investment 
itself tended to be treated differently by accountants than might be assumed or wished by 
economists using the accounts. 
  A further outcome of the debate was then the vast and continuously expanding 
literature of the new empirical industrial organization (NEIO), which, as described by 
Bresnahan (1989), uses various models of firm demand, supply, and behavior to infer true 
                                                 
4 Another way of saying this is that short run and long run marginal cost may differ, and that in an out-of-
equilibrium situation a rational firm may price at the former rather than at the latter.  Of course this in turn raises 
the issue of how to define the short run versus the long run, a matter I do not consider here. 
5 See, for example, Brozen (1971) and Weiss (1974). 
6 Or, as stated succinctly by Boone, et al. (2007), “Conditional on a firm’s costs, a high PCM indicates market 
power.  But, conditional on price, high PCM reflects efficiency.”   3
marginal cost from firm behavior.  Today it is a rare paper in industrial economics – 
McCloughan, et al. (2007) is an example – that uses price-cost margins calculated from firm 
or industry income statements as the bases for inferences concerning market power. 
  It may be useful to examine in a bit more detail why the average variable cost measure 
taken from a firm’s income statement may be not only a very inexact measure of true 
economic cost, as Fisher (1987) demonstrated, but also potentially a systematically poor 
approximation of marginal cost – and what are the more fundamental implications of this 
point.  Consider the simplest introductory microeconomics cost analysis of Figure 1.  Set TC 
= VC + FC, so that AC = AVC + FC/Q.  At a long run, sustainable, competitive equilibrium 
with U-shaped cost curves like these, the profit-maximizing firm produces where MC = AC.  
Note from Figure 1 that a) this point is to the right of the point – i.e., at a greater quantity than 
– where MC = AVC, and b) the vertical distance between the point where MC = AVC and 
the point where MC = AC – the degree to which AVC is a poor approximation for MC in 
long-run equilibrium – is greater, the greater is the difference between AC and AVC – i.e., 
the greater is FC/Q, the capital intensity of the firm.  Another way of saying this is that at the 
equilibrium point, the firm produces where MC = AVC + FC/Q.  
     
  This is hardly a new idea.  Consider the discussion in Carlton and Perloff (2005), 
where it is argued that using the average variable cost data from income statements as a   4
measure of marginal cost “can lead to serious bias”.  Defining r as the competitive rate of 
return on capital, δ as the depreciation rate, pK as the price of capital, and v as “the cost of the 
labor and materials needed to produce one unit of output”, they specify marginal cost as 
(1)    MC = v + (r + δ)(pKK/Q), 
i.e., the difference between theoretical marginal cost (MC) and measured average variable 
cost (v) is “the rental value of capital” per unit of output.  Empirical researchers such as 
Nickell (1996) and Aghion, et al. (2005) have followed suit, calculating an approximation of 
the Lerner index by subtracting from total revenues not only measured variable costs but also 
a cost-of-capital term corresponding to the final term in the Carlton and Perloff definition.
7 
  However, the broader point is not only a measurement issue.  There is a reason that 
the marginal cost curve is rising at the equilibrium point in Figure 1:  at this point, some 
inputs or assets are becoming scarce, with the shadow prices on the associated constraints on 
output expansion gradually moving from zero into the positive range.  For the firm to 
continue to compete at this steady state equilibrium, it must address these constraints.  That 
is, at this point of steady state equilibrium its true marginal cost includes the cost of relaxing 
capacity constraints – the cost of capital.  A new paper by Rajan and Reichelstein (2009) 
makes this point clearly in the context of managerial accounting: 
A profit maximizing firm imputes the average historical cost … as the relevant cost 
(provided depreciation is calculated according to the [appropriate] rule) when it 
considers additional investments in capacity.  Barring shocks to market demand, one 
would therefore expect a profit-maximizing firm to set a price that covers the 
capacity-related sunk costs.  (p. 850) 
The paper then makes very clear the assumption required that the firm is in a long run steady 
state equilibrium: 
To be sure, as the firm takes only the incremental costs into consideration at date T, it 
might at that point in time prefer a lower price in exchange for a higher level of output 
and sales.  However, the presence of the capacity constraint makes this infeasible.  
(ibid.) 
  The clear lesson from the Carlton and Perloff specification, the simple MC = AVC + 
FC/Q result, and the Rajan and Reichelstein result is that the competitive equilibrium mark-
up of price over average variable cost in an industry with U-shaped cost curves is a function 
                                                 
7 This strategy does not, of course, get around the measurement problems identified by Fisher (1987).   5
of the capital intensity of the firm or market.
8  That is, in a long run, sustainable equilibrium, 
a rational manager seeking to set price equal to (long run, economic) marginal cost should 
set price equal to (measured) average variable cost plus a mark-up adequate to earn a return 
on the firm’s (equilibrium, steady state) capital stock. 
  Two points follow immediately.  First, the mark-up resulting from such pricing will 
not be competed away by investment from new market entrants, because the returns on such 
investment would be below the cost of capital. 
  Second, in the short run, out of a sustainable equilibrium, the lesson does not apply.  
In particular, if demand shifts unexpectedly, if there is excess capacity, if there is unforecast 
technological change or entry, the rational manager may set prices without regard to earning 
a return on invested capital, since no such return is available in the market.  This in turn is the 
reason that the aforementioned surveys of managers typically yield tempered responses 
suggesting that mark-up pricing is practiced except when market conditions make it 
impossible or unprofitable. 
  These statements will surprise no business person.  Setting price equal to average 
variable cost, with no “margin” for fixed costs, is a strategy for firms exiting a market, not for 
long-term survival.
9  Of course a firm that can price discriminate may seek to serve additional 
customers who pay prices that cover variable costs and make some contribution, however 
small, to fixed costs, but this is a separate issue, not central to the overall price setting 
discussion. 
  This finding has implications for antitrust enforcement as well.  The authoritative 
treatise of Areeda, Kaplow, and Edlin (2004) argues that even considering measurement 
problems,  
This is not to suggest that cost and profit measures are never useful.  When power is 
particularly great, large price-cost divergences might clearly emerge despite 
substantial ambiguity in the data….  Clear evidence of a substantial divergence does 
not merely suggest market power; it is the very definition of power. 
                                                 
8 See also Areeda, et al. (2007), at ¶516:  “No matter how accurately measured, of course, a substantial excess of 
price over marginal cost does not necessarily bring excess returns on investment.  A firm generates excess profit 
only if price exceeds its average total cost, including its cost of capital.  Thus, a firm that does best at an output 
where price is $3 and marginal cost is $1 will earn excessive, normal, or below-normal returns, depending on 
whether its average total cost at that output is, say, $2, $3, or $4.  The gap between average variable cost and 
average total cost is, of course, greater for more capital-intensive firms.” 
9 Brennan (2003) makes the point cogently regarding regulatory restrictions on prices exceeding average 
variable costs in the electricity sector:  “Under a [P = AVC] standard for competitive pricing, no generator 
would be built.”   6
Even the indispensable paper of Kaplow and Shapiro (2007), as it considers the statement in 
the famous Alcoa decision that while a ninety percent market share “is enough to constitute a 
monopoly; it is doubtful whether sixty or sixty-four percent would be enough; and certainly 
thirty-three percent is not,”
10 asks   
Might the court have thought that monopoly power consists of the ability to sustain a 
margin of at least 20%, that a 90% share conferred the power to price 35% above cost, 
a 33% share only 10% above cost, and a 60-64% share somewhere near 20%?  Or 
might it have thought that monopoly power required only the ability to sustain a 10% 
margin, but that the power implied by each of the stated shares was only half as high? 
One lesson of this note is that there is no single price-cost margin that suggests normal or 
competitive behavior, just as there is no single price-cost margin beyond which market power 
may be inferred.  In fact, without investigating further, it would seem remarkable in a 
business as capital-intensive as the manufacture of aluminum for prices not to be marked up 
20 percent over variable costs. 
  The broader point, though, is that if a profit-maximizing firm sets price equal to 
marginal cost in long run, sustainable, competitive equilibrium, that marginal cost must 
include some return on capital, and thus it cannot be equal to the average variable cost 
measured by accountants.  When economists forget this, their labeling of entrepreneurs as 
“irrational” is not persuasive. 
 
 
                                                 
10 148 F.2
nd 416, 424 (2d Cir. 1945)   7
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